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1Signiﬁcant increases in pharmaceutical spending over the past two decades have lead to public
outrage over the cost of prescription drugs. Pharmaceutical research and development is an
expensive process – in 2000 it was estimated that drug companies spent more than $800 million
in R&D for each new chemical entity that was brought to market. These R&D costs should be
divided across all users of the new drugs. However, due to the widespread use of cost controls
in other countries, on average Americans pay 40% to 125% more for a prescription drug than
foreign citizens. Foreign governments are pushing a disproportionate amount of drug research
costs onto American citizens – Americans believe they are subsidizing health care for the rest
of the world.
The outrage over high U.S. prescription drug prices has lead to a growing movement in the United States to
allow reimportation of drugs from other countries. Unfortunately, while reimportation may reduce price disparities
between the U.S. and other nations, it will do so by importing the ineﬃcient cost control regulations present in
other countries.
Economic theory suggests that cost controls are necessary in pharmaceutical markets due to the threat of moral
hazard. Cost controls eliminate market distortions and can be economically beneﬁcial for both drug ﬁrms and
pharmaceutical consumers. However, imposing cost regulations can be dangerous if the cost cuts are too deep.
Regulatory systems charged with cutting drug prices are motivated to ignore the large sunk costs of R&D and set
drug prices at the marginal cost of serving their population – which can often be as little as 25% of the cost of a
drug. Further, the global beneﬁts of pharmaceuticals create a free-rider problem where governments can achieve
the beneﬁts of new drug developments without having to pay the associated costs of researching that drug.
This paper outlinines an international approach that will allow drug manufacturers to equitably recoup global
joint research costs, while recognizing the international need for constraints on prescription drug spending. Due
to the prisoner’s dilemma associated with government pricing of prescription drugs, the only way to ensure an
equitable distribution of R&D expenditures is with a comprehensive treaty that limits the forms of cost controls
each member nation can impose. The treaty, which is based on the British system of regulating pharmaceutical
company proﬁt margins, ensures that each country contributes a minimum share of the joint costs associated
with the development of a pharmaceutical. Global R&D costs are allocated between member nations based on a
formula that accounts for the level of prescription usage in each country and that accounts for the ﬁnancial ability
of a country to fund global drug development. However, the treaty allows member nations signiﬁcant discretion
to curtail drug prices by regulating advertising, manufacturing, regulatory, liability, and other drug costs.
2Section I. Introduction.
Though there have been repeated calls to impose price regulations on prescription drugs since the 1960’s, the
debate has taken on a new priority and many now think change is ﬁnally on the way.1 The convergence of several
diﬀerent factors has lead Americans to the conclusion that regulation of the industry is now necessary. The ﬁrst
factor is the rapidly rising cost of prescription drugs. Prescription drug spending in the United States has risen
more than 12.2 percent annually between 1980 and 2002.2 Further, prescription drug spending is projected to
increase by 7.4 percent annually over the next ten years – far outpacing the rate of inﬂation.3 With costs rising so
rapidly, at least 75 million people, or 27 percent of the U.S. population, do not have prescription drug coverage.4
Further, while Americans are laboring to pay the rising costs of prescription drugs, pharmaceutical companies
are recording record proﬁts. Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have posted average proﬁt margins of
between 20 and 25 percent since 1999.5 These companies have outperformed the S&P 500 every year for the
past ﬁve years.6
The ﬁnal, and probably most important, factor driving the call for regulating prescription drug costs is the
signiﬁcant disparity between American prices and prices in foreign countries. Every industrialized country except
1 See, e.g., Bush Administration Reconsidering Canadian Drugs, May 7, 2004, YahooNews, at
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ibsys/20040507/ lo wisc/2196499 (Secretary of HHS acknowledges drug
reimportation is inevitable and President Bush should not stand in the way).
2 Data taken from CMS tables. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 2002 National
Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables, at table 2, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-
2002/t2.asp; CMS, 2003 National Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables, at table 2, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2003/t2.asp.
3 See CMS, 2003 National Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables, at table 2, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2003/t2.asp.
4 The Congressional Budget Oﬃce estimated about 60 million nonelderly Americans did not have insurance for at least part of
1998. See Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), How Many People Lack Health Insurance and For How Long? (May 2003), available
at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/42xx/doc4210/05-12-Uninsured.pdf. Also, 47 percent of the 31.1 million Medicare beneﬁciaries did not have
coverage for prescriptions. See Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization,
and Prices (April 2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/.
5 See CMS, Health Care Industry Market Update: Pharmaceuticals (January 10, 2003), at 4, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/hcimu/hcimu 01102003.pdf.
6 See id. at 24.
3for the U.S. imposes some form of government cost control on prescription drug expenditures. As a result, average
prices for patented prescription drugs are 40 to 125 percent higher in the United States than they are in other
industrialized countries.7 U.S. consumers believe they are subsidizing health care for the rest of the world – they
are now pushing for cost control measures that will eliminate this unfair price disparity.
So far, lawmakers are reluctant to mandate that the government directly negotiate prices with pharmaceutical
companies, as many other foreign governments do.8 Reform eﬀorts have instead focused on using private health
insurers and managed care providers to negotiate lower prices on behalf of the government. At the same time,
lawmakers want to legalize the reimportation of drugs from overseas to help reduce international price discrepan-
cies.9 Congress believes it is preferable to resolve this dilemma with market-based reforms rather than by resorting
to broad, direct government regulation.10
On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies argue that current drug prices are necessary to recoup the signiﬁcant
research and development expenses associated with bringing a new drug to market. A recent study concluded
that pharmaceutical companies spend an average of $800 million for each new chemical entity (NCE) that is
brought to market.11 Two signiﬁcant components of these R&D expenditures are the cost of investigating failed
compounds and the cost of capital associated with the average twelve-year lag from concept to launch.12
7 This estimate is based on the discounted prices that the federal government and large private insurers are able to negotiate with
drug manufacturers – price diﬀerentials for retail customers are even greater. See CBO, Would Prescription Drug Importation
Reduce U.S. Drug Spending? (April 29, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5406&sequence=0.
8 Jackie Koszczuk, Medicare overhaul leaves questions about how to control rising drug prices, CQ Weekly (Dec. 6 2003),
at 3034.
9 See Kate Schuler, Republicans taking a second look at drug reimportation proposals, CQ Weekly (Apr. 17 2004), at
909.
10 See id.
11 See Joseph A. DiMasi, et al., The price of innovation: New estimates of drug development costs, 22 Journal of
Health Economics 151 (2003). Another estimate by the public interest group Public Citizen places the cost of each new drug
at $110 million. See Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against The Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card”
(2003). However, this study is based on 1993 cost estimates and does not apply a discount rate to costs based on costs of
capital. Further, the study includes drug applications for reformulations and for treating new indications, not only applications
for NCE’s. Finally, the study does not accurately account for the costs associated with the testing of failed compounds. See id.
12 See Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 5 – 6 (1997).
4Research expenditures account for more than 30% of the cost of a new drug therapy while the marginal cost of
serving another pharmaceutical customer can be as little as 25% of the cost of a new drug.13 Due to the large
sunk costs and low marginal costs associated with a drug therapy, government regulation can have disastrous
consequences. Accordingly, government cost control regulations are biased towards reducing drug prices to the
marginal cost of serving that nation’s population.14 Governments can save money by pushing the joint costs of
research, which should be borne equally by all users,15 onto the citizens of foreign governments. As such marginal
cost pricing becomes widespread, the inability of pharmaceutical companies to recover their sunk research costs will
reduce incentives for future research into innovate drugs. The short-term price reductions come at the potential
cost of failing to develop innovative new therapeutics that could save countless numbers of lives.16
Despite the potential dangers associated with government-imposed cost regulations, in a single-payer health care
system, these cost controls can play an economically beneﬁcial role by reducing moral hazard.17 Governments
must therefore maintain a balance between the need to impose cost controls and the need to maintain incentives
for future pharmaceutical research.18
This article begins by brieﬂy describing the health care industry and the economics of the drug industry in Part
II. Part III then describes and analyzes pharmaceutical cost control regimes used by foreign governments. Part
IV then looks at recent proposals calling for the reimportation of drugs into the U.S. After concluding that drug
reimportation will not fairly allocate the joint costs of pharmaceutical research, Part V presents an alternate
international framework for eﬀectively allocated these joint costs. The framework calls for an international treaty
that will restrict the type and extent of cost control regulations that member nations can enact.
13 See id. at 3.
14 See id.
15 As discussed later, ideally joint costs should not actually be shared equally but rather should be allocated in proportion to
the willingness to pay. See infra Part II.2.
16 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 3.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 6.
5Part II. Pharmaceutical market structure and the eﬀects of price controls.
1. Structure of the health care market
The structure of health care markets is important because it aﬀects how pharmaceutical companies are able to
reap the beneﬁts of their innovations. The United States is one of a few nations whose health care system is
a true mix of private and public health care plans.19 The main players in the U.S. public health care system
are Medicare and Medicaid. Approximately 5 percent of the U.S. population is covered through Medicare and 9
percent is covered through Medicaid.20 Medicare is a federal program that provides health care coverage for the
elderly and disabled. Medicare is operated as an indemnity program – that is the program does not employ its
own physicians or hospitals. Instead, patients are treated by private physicians and use private hospitals that have
been pre-approved by the program. The Medicare program then reimburses these private parties a predetermined
fee for the services they provide to Medicare patients. Medicare is funded through a combination of employment
tax revenues, general revenues, and premiums paid by the individuals receiving coverage.21 While Medicare covers
inpatient drugs, it does not yet have outpatient prescription drug coverage.22
Medicaid is a state-funded program that provides coverage for the poor. This program is also operated as an
indemnity program. The program maintains its own list of approved doctors and hospitals and sets a ﬁxed re-
imbursement rate for services, just as Medicare does. Medicaid however oﬀers an outpatient prescription drug
beneﬁt. Medicaid beneﬁciaries usually obtain pharmaceuticals from a retail pharmacy. The program then reim-
burses the pharmacies a ﬁxed price to cover the cost of the drugs.23
19 See Albert Wertheimer, et al., Pharmacy in the Western World Health Care Systems, in Contested Ground 159,
169 (Peter Davis ed., 1996).
20 See CMS, Health Care System: Facts and Figures, at table 1.4, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/healthcaresystem/.
21 See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 169-170.
22 Prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Act does not begin till 2006. Pub. Law No. 108-173 (Dec. 8 2003).
23 See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 169-170.
6The U.S. health care system also consists of two basic types of private health care plans – conventional indemnity
plans and health maintenance organizations (HMO).24 An indemnity program works the same way as Medicare;
an insurance company reimburses a service provider for medical care rendered. Patients might or might not be
required to see pre-approved providers, depending on the speciﬁcs of the plan. HMOs, on the other hand, are
much more integrated than traditional indemnity programs. HMOs aim to reduce costs by closely managing
the services hospitals and physicians provide to beneﬁciaries. Often, the HMOs will directly own the hospitals
and directly employ the physicians proving services. In exchange for lower premiums, HMOs usually have more
restrictions on the level of service provided and more restrictions on the choice of service providers.25 Prescription
drug coverage in these private programs varies from plan to plan, however almost all plans have some level of
drug coverage.26 Currently, about 70% of Americans are enrolled in a private health insurance plan,27 and 23%
of these private plan beneﬁciaries are in HMO plans.28 There has been a long-term trend away from indemnity
plans towards HMOs.29 Unfortunately, 16% of the U.S. population has no health care insurance coverage.30
Unlike the U.S., most foreign countries guarantee health care coverage for all citizens.31 Government can provide
universal health care coverage through one of two methods, either through a national health insurance program
(NHI) or through a national health service (NHS) program. Most countries operate a form of NHI.32 NHI beneﬁ-
ciaries receive services at private hospitals and clinics, and the government reimburses these expenses through tax
revenue. On the other hand, an NHS system is operated more like an HMO. The British and Canadian systems
resemble this NHS structure. The government often owns the hospitals and clinics and directly employs physicians
24 See id. Conventional indemnity plans here also includes PPO and POS systems which are basic indemnity plans that
have some HMO-like qualities.
25 See id.
26 See Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), Survey of Employer Health Benefits (1999), available at
http://www.kﬀ.org/insurance/index.cfm.
27 See CMS, supra note 20, at table 1.4. Figure does not include Medicare beneﬁciaries enrolled in private supplemental
insurance plans.
28 See id. at table 4.11.
29 See id.
30 See id. at table 1.4.
31 See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 170.
32 See id.
7and other health care workers. The government administers the whole system and funds operation of the system
through tax revenues.33
In the United States, there are two major government health care programs and many diﬀerent private programs.
These programs directly reimburse pharmaceutical companies for the cost of prescription drugs. However, most
foreign countries have universal health care systems. In both types of universal health care programs, the gov-
ernment is the sole health care plan provider and is the sole entity that reimburses pharmaceutical companies for
prescription drugs. These governments are monopsonists, the opposite of monopolists, because they are the only
purchasers of a product rather than the only supplier.34 These monopsonist systems are also termed single-payer
systems. The governments can use their market power as monopsonists to impose stringent cost controls for
prescription drugs. While large U.S. service providers are also able to negotiate discounts with pharmaceutical
companies, no U.S. provider is large enough to exercise as much power as a single-payer foreign government. The
presence of a single-payer system has signiﬁcant eﬀects on prescription drug pricing, as we will see later.35
2. Cost structure of a pharmaceutical
In 2000, the average cost of bringing a new pharmaceutical36 to market was more than $800 million.37 Drugs that
are ranked by the FDA as the most innovative have even higher development costs.38 The pharmaceutical drug
industry invests enormous amounts of money in R&D – almost 18% of sales in 1994.39 However, this number
signiﬁcantly understates the true cost of R&D, since the average NCE requires 12 years of R&D before being
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See infra Part II.4.
36 Meaning a NCE, or new chemical entity. The cost R&D cost does not include reformulations and the application of existing
drugs to new indications.
37 See DiMasi, supra note 11, at 169.
38 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 7.
39 See CBO, How Health Care Reform Affects Pharmaceutical Research and Development (June 1994), at ix.
8brought to market.40 As listed in Table 1, when all costs associated with a drug are converted to present value
at the time of launch, R&D accounts for 30% of a drug’s cost, while the marginal cost of manufacturing is only
25% of the drug’s total cost.
Table 1. Pharmaceutical cost structure: Discounted present
value
at
launch
(per-
cent
of
to-
tal
cost
af-
ter
tax)41
Tax Assumptions
46%
cor-
po-
rate
46%
tax
plus
Cost
com-
po-
nent
tax R&D credits
Total R&D Cost 31.1 29.7
R&D
sunk
costs
29.0 27.6
Ongoing R&D
costs
2.1 2.1
40 See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks, and Rewards (1993).
41 Chart taken from Danzon, supra note 12, at 6.
9Total
Man-
u-
fac-
tur-
ing
Cost
28.2 28.7
Manufacturing and distribution 25.3 25.8
Capital
ex-
pen-
di-
tures
2.9 2.9
Other
Marketing
costs
23.4 23.9
General
and
ad-
min-
is-
tra-
tive
costs
11.5 11.7
Working
cap-
i-
tal
3.3 3.4
Value of inventory 2.4
2.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Assumes 10% cost of capital.
The development costs associated with bringing a drug to market are sunk costs – that is, the pharmaceutical
companies have already incurred the expenditures at the time the product is launched. Pharmaceutical companies
10must rely on the patent system to recover these sunk costs. Once a company has discovered a drug treatment,
in the absence of patent protection, any drug company can manufacture and market a generic version of that
drug. While the pharmaceutical company must sell the drug at a price that allows the company to recoup its
sunk R&D costs, the generic manufacturer has not incurred these sunk costs. The generic manufacturer and can
thus sell the drugs at a much cheaper price, as much as 30% cheaper, as illustrated by Table 1. The patent
system protects pharmaceutical companies by granting them market exclusivity for a limited period of time.42
The drug companies can recoup their sunk R&D expenses during the patent period without fear of competition
from generic manufacturers.
3. Optimal pricing for pharmaceuticals
The high ratio of sunk costs to marginal costs presents a challenge for pharmaceutical companies. The
patent system helps resolve this challenge by granting pharmaceutical companies a limited monopoly. Phar-
maceutical companies must then price their products in a manner so as to maximize proﬁts from this limited
monopoly. In most industries, producers charge every customer the same price for a given good.43 However,
uniform pricing results in a large deadweight loss for pharmaceuticals companies, as illustrated by Figure 1.
Consumers who are willing to pay more for prescription drugs will pay less than their true marginal beneﬁt.
Consumers who are less willing to pay for prescriptions will face a price that exceeds their budget and will
therefore drop out of market – even though those consumers may have been willing to pay a price higher
than the marginal cost of production.44 The two lined areas represent a deadweight loss. A drug has created
a social surplus, but companies are unable to collect value from the created surplus. Since pharmaceuti-
42 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 8.
43 See id. at 11.
44 See id.
11cal companies face this deadweight loss, many otherwise socially beneﬁcial drugs45 will never be developed
because companies will not be able to recover the expenses associated with research and development.46
Marginal Cost
Quantity
Price
Demand Curve
Figure 1. Total revenue collected under a uniform pricing model.
The economist Frank Ramsey developed a more optimal pricing scheme.47 For industries with high sunk costs
and low marginal costs, Ramsey argued the most eﬃcient pricing mechanism is to charge consumers diﬀerent
prices based on their relative price elasticities – ﬁrms should charge more to consumers that that are willing to
pay more. The principle of price discrimination is applied in other industries with high joint costs, such as utilities
and airlines.48 Peak-time users pay more for electricity than oﬀ-peak users. Similarly, people who book ﬂights in
advance and accept minimum stay requirements or other restrictions pay less for airline ﬂights.
Accordingly, pharmaceutical ﬁrms should charge higher prices to consumers that are more willing to pay those
higher prices, and should charge lower prices to consumers that are not willing to pay the high prices. Diﬀerential
45 That is, drugs whose development cost is less than the social value they create.
46 See id. at 11.
47 See Frank Ramsey, A contribution to the theory of taxation, 37 Economic Journal 47-61 (1927).
48 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 11.
12pricing, as depicted in Figure 2, raises total revenue because now those consumers with a higher valuation pay more
for their prescriptions and those customers with lower valuations now purchase the prescription and contribute
to revenue. This reduces or eliminates the amount of deadweight loss. A diﬀerential pricing scheme maximizes
social welfare because pharmaceutical ﬁrms will develop all drugs with a net positive social value – that is all
drugs whose beneﬁts outweigh their costs.49
Marginal Cost
Demand Curve
Price
Quantity
Figure 2. Increased total revenue under a diﬀerential pricing model.
Not only is diﬀerential pricing more economically eﬃcient than uniform pricing, it is also more socially beneﬁcial.
Consumers who would not be able to aﬀord a pharmaceutical in the uniform pricing model will now have access
to the drug. Also, since costs are spread out over more people and are allocated with respect to each consumer’s
willingness to pay, diﬀerential pricing results in a more equitable distribution of the costs associated with research
and development.
49 See id. at 12.
134. Market distortions under indemnity insurance systems
The Ramsey pricing model describes the optimal pricing method in a competitive market. However, due to
distortions in the pharmaceutical market caused by the presence of indemnity insurance programs, the Ramsey
model of diﬀerential pricing is not feasible and another framework must be adopted to determine optimal pricing.
Most citizens in developed countries have health care through an indemnity insurance program. 84% of Americans
have some form of insurance coverage and most other developed countries have universal indemnity coverage.50
The presence of indemnity insurance systems, and especially single-payer indemnity systems, creates two distortions
in the pharmaceutical market – uniform pricing and moral hazard.
Uniform pricing
The presence of an insurer creates a market distortion because the insurer will reimburse the same price for all
beneﬁciaries that ﬁll a prescription. Since customers now purchase pharmaceuticals in groups, it is more diﬃcult
for pharmaceutical companies to apply diﬀerential pricing. The eﬀect is most pronounced under single-payer
systems. Since the government insures all residents of the country, a pharmaceutical company will be reimbursed
the same price for all prescriptions sold in that country. As a consequence of charging a uniform price, there will
be a deadweight loss as illustrated in Figure 1 above.51
50 See supra Part II.1.
51 See supra Part II.3.
14Moral hazard
The use of indemnity insurance creates a second distortion, moral hazard. Moral hazard is characteristic of every
indemnity insurance market.52 Moral hazard is the tendency for an individual’s behavior to change because of the
presence of insurance coverage.53 For instance, an individual that is covered by insurance may undertake more
risky behavior than he would without insurance because he knows that the ultimate cost of his risky behavior will
fall on his insurer and not come out of his own pocket. Similarly, when a patient is admitted to the hospital, he
may choose to stay longer than necessary because he knows the insurance company will pay for the stay.
Moral hazard can be divided into two types, consumer moral hazard and producer moral hazard.54 Consumer
moral hazard occurs when an insured patient demands more medical services than he would if he were paying for
those services himself.55 Consumer moral hazard can be further divided into two subcategories: ex ante and ex
post moral hazard. Ex ante moral hazard occurs when a patient in a healthy state fails to take the appropriate
preventive measures prior to sickness because the patient will not have to bear the costs of treating the sickness.
For example, a patient is less likely to eat healthy and exercise if he knows that an insurer will cover the cost
of cholesterol-reducing statin drugs. Conversely, ex post moral hazard occurs when the patient is already ill. A
patient is more likely to obtain a prescription rather than consuming a cheaper over-the-counter drug if an insurer
pays for the prescription drug.
Consumer moral hazard is dangerous because it leads to an excessive demand for prescription drugs – more
pharmaceuticals are consumed than would be expected under normal market conditions.56 There is a welfare loss
52 See Atif Ahmad, What is Meant by Moral Hazard? (2002), at http://www.econ.qmw.ac.uk/NHS reforms.com/student ﬁle/insurance2.2.pdf.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
15to society since the costs of prescription drugs exceed their beneﬁts to patients.57 This welfare loss is indicated
in Figure 3 by the dotted area. Assuming the insurer pays a ﬁxed cost for the drug it reimburses, the dotted
area represents extra costs born by the insurer due to the presence of moral hazard. Without the presence of
insurance, the patients indicated in the dotted area would never have purchased the prescription drug.
Price
Demand Curve
Price paid by insurer
Quantity
Marginal Cost
Figure 3. Welfare loss due to consumer moral hazard (dotted area).
Producer moral hazard, on the other hand, occurs when physicians prescribe more drugs than they would in the
absence of insurance coverage.58 Since physicians are not paying for the pharmaceuticals, they have no reason
to limit their usage. For example, assume a patient has a headache and a physician can recommend one of two
remedies, a cheap over-the-counter (OTC) drug or an expensive prescription, and each remedy will have equal
57 See id.
58 See id.
16eﬀectiveness. Though the most eﬃcient choice is to recommend the OTC drug, the physician is at best indiﬀerent
to the choice.
Producer moral hazard is ampliﬁed by indemnity insurance since most insurance plans operate under a fee-
for-service (FFS) reimbursement system.59 Under this type of reimbursement, insurance companies reimburse
a physician every time a patient comes in for an oﬃce visit. A FFS program creates a ﬁnancial incentive for
doctors to maximize the number of oﬃce visits by patients. Since oﬃce visits concerning pharmaceuticals
are relatively short and easy, prescribing unnecessary prescriptions is often a very convenient method of
generating extra income. Therefore, physicians in FFS programs tend to prescribe pharmaceuticals in excess
of the quantities they would prescribe if they were paid just a ﬁxed salary.60 While producer moral hazard
occurs even in the absence of indemnity coverage, indemnity coverage magniﬁes the eﬀect because the doctor
knows the patient will not have to pay the cost of the increased services and also because the patient has
little incentive to restrain the physician’s behavior.
Producer moral hazard is also termed supplier-induced demand (SID).61 This supplier-induced demand has
the eﬀect of shifting the observed demand curve to the right of what the true demand is. Some patients are
now not demanding the drug because of the beneﬁts to themselves, but because the physician prescribed
it. This eﬀect is illustrated graphically in Figure 4. The lined area represents the additional welfare loss
created because these consumers would not have taken the drug in the absence of the eﬀects of producer
moral hazard.
Observed Demand Curve
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
17Actual Demand Curve
Price
Price paid by insurer
Marginal Cost
Quantity
Figure 4. Additional welfare loss due to producer moral hazard (red lines).
Thus, both types of moral hazard lead to an increased consumption of pharmaceutical drugs – in other words,
there is an “artiﬁcial demand” for drugs. This artiﬁcial demand creates a distortion in the pharmaceutical market
because the excess consumption of drugs leads to higher total revenues than the pharmaceutical company would
be able to collect in a market with no insurance coverage.62 This is illustrated graphically in Figures 3 and 4; the
total revenue collected by the drug companies (all colored area) is greater than the resulting total revenue under
the Ramsey model in Figure 2. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies collect more revenue than the total social
beneﬁt of the drug.63 This will cause pharmaceutical companies to invest more money than is socially optimal into
research and development – a behavior termed “rent-seeking”. This is economically ineﬃcient because companies
will develop drugs that have a net social loss – the development cost outweighs the corresponding social beneﬁt.
The overconsumption of prescriptions is a price-neutral eﬀect of moral hazard. Moral hazard also has a
62 The Ramsey diﬀerential model is yields the highest revenue a pharmaceutical company can collect in a free market because
theoretically the revenue collected equals the total social surplus created by the drug.
63 In Figure 4, the total revenue, which is the sum of the colored areas, is greater than the area under the demand curve.
18direct eﬀect on the price drug companies will charge. In a market with no insurance coverage, the price a
pharmaceutical company charges is constrained by the patient – a patient will only pay for a pharmaceutical
if the cost is less than the patient’s valuation. However, in the presence of indemnity insurance, the patient is
completely indiﬀerent to cost of a drug. Pharmaceutical companies can charge higher prices than they could
under normal market conditions because consumers do not have an incentive to discipline these prices. This
behavior will lead to higher revenues for pharmaceutical companies and consequently there is once again the
risk of excessive rent-seeking.
Combating overconsumption caused by moral hazard
There is a strong incentive to constrain moral hazard so as to reduce welfare loss and prevent excessive rent-
seeking. However, eﬀorts by insurers to limit moral hazard are restrained by informational asymmetries.64
For example, insurance plans could constrain moral hazard by monitoring prescription usage more carefully.
However, the beneﬁts of monitoring are low compared to the costs. Even if an insurer monitors every
prescription, the insurer has no way of predicting how a particular patient would have behaved in the
absence of insurance coverage. Similarly, the beneﬁts of monitoring producer moral hazard are limited
because it is diﬃcult to determine when a physician is legitimately prescribing a medicine and when he is
just prescribing one to increase proﬁts.
In the alternative, one cost-eﬀective method for restraining consumer moral hazard is the use of expense
pass-throughs, such as deductibles and co-payments. This strategy combats consumer moral hazard by in-
creasing the patient’s out-of-pocket cost for each prescription. Imposing an out-of-pocket expense decreases
64 See id.
19the welfare loss associated with insurance coverage65, as illustrated in Figure 5. The out-of-pocket pay-
ment convinces some users who would otherwise have taken the drug to not consume it. The drawback
to pass-throughs is that there is a limit to how much insurers can charge patients out-of-pocket; as out-of-
pocket expenses increase, the amount of insurance protection decreases. Thus, pass-throughs are eﬀective
at discouraging frivolous drug usage, but there is still a signiﬁcant welfare loss even with pass-throughs in
place.
Marginal Cost
Out-of-pocket cost
Price
Demand Curve
Price paid by insurer
Quantity
Figure 5. Reduction in welfare loss due to out-of-pocket expenses (yellow lines).
65 The amount of decrease is represented by the lined area.
20In contrast, a strategy for combating producer moral hazard involves altering a physician’s ﬁnancial incentives.
If a physician does not bear any of the costs associated with prescribing a drug, the physician has no incentive
to perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis concerning the drug. Insurers can alter a physician’s ﬁnancial incentives in
several ways. Insurers can eliminate the incentive to increase oﬃce visits by providing the physician a ﬁxed salary.
They can also alter the physician’s ﬁnancial incentives by making physicians personally liable for drug costs if the
physician prescribes more drugs than a pre-set limit. However, these methods also have their drawbacks. Limits
on physician prescriptions create a conﬂict of interest for the physician; the doctor now has a ﬁnancial incentive to
not provide proper care to the patient. If these controls are too stringent, they have the eﬀect of lowering demand
beyond the point of true demand. Then some people who really need the drugs will be denied access. These and
other methods for controlling both consumer and producer moral hazard are discussed more fully later.66
While all three of the above methods – monitoring, expense pass-throughs, and physician incentives – reduce
moral hazard somewhat, none of these methods can eliminate the welfare loss created by moral hazard. Due
to informational asymmetries, monitoring is a not a very eﬀective method at reducing moral hazard. Increasing
out-of-pocket expenses reduces consumer moral hazard, but there is a limit to the expenses that patients are
willing to bear. Physician incentives can also reduce moral hazard, but these systems are expensive and also
create a conﬂict of interest for treating physicians. However, there is one other method by which insurers can
reduce the welfare loss associated with moral hazard.
Combating pricing eﬀects of moral hazard
The other primary method by which insurers can combat moral hazard is by negotiating lower prices. As illustrated
66 See infra Part III.
21in Figure 6, the more an insurer can lower prices, the more it can reduce the welfare loss associated with insurance
coverage.67 Taken to an extreme, this means that insurers should price pharmaceuticals down to their marginal cost
because this will result in the lowest welfare loss. However, as stated earlier, this is unacceptable to pharmaceutical
companies because then they cannot recover the sunk costs associated with a drug’s development.
Original Price
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Figure 6. Reduction in welfare loss due to lower price (yellow lines).
In a competitive market, where there are multiple insurance companies and multiple pharmaceutical ﬁrms, an
insurer will negotiate with a pharmaceutical company and ostensibly the two will come to a mutually agreeable
67 The amount of decrease in welfare loss is indicated by the lined area.
22price. The pharmaceutical company has a monopoly on production of the drug and the insurer has no other way
to acquire the drug. If the insurer does not cover enough of the drugs in demand, patients will leave and go to
another insurance company. On the other hand, the insurer is paying the cost of the prescription and has control
over which prescriptions it will choose to reimburse. If the pharmaceutical company cannot convince the insurer
to cover the cost of the prescription, its sales will signiﬁcantly drop. With the presence of these two countervailing
market pressures, the market will reach an optimal equilibrium price.
However, these same market pressures do not apply in the case of a single-payer system. A single-payer system has
signiﬁcantly more market power than a pharmaceutical company, granting it much greater negotiating leverage.
The single-payer system is a monopoly – it is the only insurance company in the country. This position gives it
signiﬁcant market power since the system provides the pharmaceutical company’s only access to consumers in
that country. While the patent system grants a pharmaceutical company a limited monopoly, the company does
not have the same market power as the single-payer system. The pharmaceutical company has many competitors
that the single-payer system can negotiate with and these competitors most likely have comparable substitutes.
Even if a pharmaceutical company has a truly unique product, the single-payer system can exert market power by
refusing to reimburse other products that the company produces.
In addition to market power, single payer systems are able to exert even more negotiating leverage through the
threat of compulsory licensing.68 Through a compulsory license, a foreign sovereign can nullify a pharmaceutical
company’s patent monopoly and grant another company the right to manufacture a generic version of the drug.
Since the generic manufacturer does not have to recoup the huge sunk costs that the original manufacturer
incurred, the generic drug can be priced signiﬁcantly below the brand name version. Though a government’s right
to impose a compulsory license is somewhat limited by the TRIPs agreement, it is still nevertheless a signiﬁcant
68 See, e.g., U.S. sets hearing on Abbott AIDS drug license, Forbes.com (April 28, 2004), at
http://www.forbes.com/business/newswire/2004/04/28/rtr1351822.html.
23threat.
With the combination of greater power market and the threat of compulsory licensing, a single-payer system it is
able to wield signiﬁcantly greater negotiating leverage than pharmaceutical companies. In eﬀect, the single-payer
plan can set prices at whatever reasonable level it chooses without fear of retaliation from a pharmaceutical
company – a real negotiation never takes place. Of course pharmaceutical companies still have some power.
For example, a pharmaceutical company can delay the introduction of a new drug into a market. Further,
pharmaceutical companies can also exert leverage on government oﬃcials through lobbying, especially on elected
oﬃcials. However, none of these alternatives can match the power of a sovereign purchaser.
With its superior negotiating leverage, a sovereign government has the power to price a drug almost as low
as it wishes. It is also has signiﬁcant incentives to set the price as low as possible, because that will reduce
health care expenditures and minimize the welfare loss associated with moral hazard. However, at the same
time, a sophisticated government should realize the detrimental eﬀects of such strict pricing. If a pharmaceutical
company cannot recover the sunk costs of R&D, then the company will not have an incentive develop other
life-saving drugs. Therefore, a sovereign government must determine an optimal pricing scheme under which it
can balance the beneﬁts of reducing prices with the need to maintain incentives for future research.
A government can achieve this goal by trying to balance the two market distortions created by a single-payer
system. The welfare loss associated with moral hazard is a negative externality while the deadweight loss created
by uniform pricing is a positive externality. As illustrated in Figure 7, a single-payer system can restore optimal
pricing for a drug by balancing the increased revenue from moral hazard (dotted area) with the decreased revenue
from uniform pricing (lined area). If the two externalities cancel each other out, then the sovereign government
ensures that the pharmaceutical company will still be able to collect total revenue equal to the social surplus
24created by the drug. The same market incentives that existed under the Ramsey pricing model are maintained.
Since total revenue equals the social surplus, pharmaceuticals companies will develop all drugs with a net social
surplus and will avoid the development of drugs with a net social deﬁcit – which maximizes economic eﬃciency.
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Figure 7. Optimal pricing under a single-payer system. The blue dotted area representing
increased revenue from moral hazard approximatle equals the blue lined area representing dead-
weight loss.
5. Avoidance of joint costs under a single-payer system
As discussed above, cost controls are economically beneﬁcial since they address distortions in the prescription
drug market that arise from a single-payer system. When imposing a cost control, a sovereign will ensure that
25the amount of revenue collected by pharmaceutical companies equals the social beneﬁt created by the drug.
This allows for a more eﬃcient allocation of capital and ensures that drug companies only market drugs with a
net positive social surplus. However, the previous model assumed a closed-market system – that is, one where
there are no imports or exports. When a single-payer system is placed in the context of a global marketplace,
the government’s behavior will change. A global pharmaceutical marketplace creates a free-rider problem that
encourages a single-payer system to price drugs at a level lower than it would in closed-market system. 69
The drug industry spends more than $800 million in research and development for every drug brought to market.70
These costs are joint costs – they do not depend on the number of people using a drug. These joint costs are
essential to production of a drug, but cannot be isolated to any particular customer or country.71 While the costs
cannot be attributed to any country, the beneﬁts accrue to all countries.
Since the beneﬁts of research accrue to all countries, a “defecting” country can choose not to contribute any of
its own money to research72 and still share in the beneﬁts of research conducted by other countries. The failure
of this defecting country to not contribute to the joint costs of R&D will slightly reduce global incentives for
research, but if this is an isolated case there, will not be a large impact on global research. The defecting country
will then be able to share in beneﬁts of global research without making its own contribution to global research –
it will be a “free rider”.73 The eﬀects of this behavior when there is one free rider are illustrated in Figure 8.
Defecting country
69 See Russell Hardin, The Free Rider Problem in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed.
Summer 2003 edition), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/.
70 See DiMasi, supra note 11, at 169.
71 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 3.
72 By pricing drugs at the cost of production.
73 See Hardin, supra note 69.
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Figure 8. Revenue loss associated with a free-rider.
A free rider problem occurs when one economic actor can beneﬁt from a good or service provided others without
contributing to that good.74 Thus, each actor has an incentive to allow others to pay for the public good and
to not personally contribute for the public good. Consider an international marketplace of twenty countries, each
with a single-payer system. Country A realizes that only a portion of the money it contributes to global R&D
accrues to its own beneﬁt. The rest of the money is spread between the other twenty countries. Thus, country A’s
incentive is to minimize its contribution to R&D because other countries are beneﬁting more from the research
than it is. Of course, each of the other nineteen countries has the same ﬁnancial incentives as Country A. Thus,
they too will impose price controls that reduce their contribution to R&D. The resulting equilibrium is that no
country contributes to joint R&D and no country is able to reap the beneﬁts of pharmaceutical innovation.
A free rider problem is a variant of an n-person prisoner’s dilemma scenario.75 While the maximum socially
beneﬁcial point is where all the market participants contribute, the threat of the other players “defecting” forces
all market participants to also defect. In a prisoner’s dilemma, not contributing is termed the “dominant strategy”
74 See id.
75 See id.
27because regardless of what the other players choose, Country A is always better oﬀ if it defects. For example, if
all the other countries choose to contribute, then Country A is better oﬀ defecting because it can free ride oﬀ of
the other countries’ contribution with no cost of its own. On the other hand, if all other countries defect, then A
is better oﬀ defecting because otherwise it will be the lone “sucker” that is paying for R&D while everyone else
will free-ride oﬀ of its contribution.
The prisoner’s dilemma is an example of a private market failure. Private markets do not provide a way to resolve
the economic ineﬃciency created by this scenario. Instead, resolving a prisoner’s dilemma requires the economic
actors to forego their normally competitive stances and to agree to cooperate to resolve the dilemma. This type
of prisoner’s dilemma is not unlike the dilemma faced in international trade. While all countries are better oﬀ
if all countries open their borders, the maximum beneﬁt derives to Country A if it keeps its borders closed and
every other country opens of its border. Removing international trade borders has required a lot of patience and
also has required multinational cooperation through treaties such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariﬀs
(GATT) and later through multinational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
While the above example was a hypothetical, as we will see later,76 Americans feel that there is suﬃcient evidence
that other countries are trying to avoid joint costs and free ride oﬀ of U.S contributions. Just as with international
trade, if the full beneﬁts of new pharmaceutical discoveries are to realized, all countries must join together and
develop an international understanding concerning pharmaceutical research.77 Due to the prisoner’s dilemma,
individual countries thinking only of their own welfare have no economic incentives to avoid defecting. Further,
due to the imbalance of market powers,78 pharmaceutical companies do not have the ability to police this dilemma
either. The only resolution to this dilemma is international cooperation. This paper outlines a possible structure
76 See infra Part IV.
77 At least all industrialized countries, since they are most able to pay the joint costs of research.
78 See supra Part II.4.
28for just such an international later in Part V.79
79 See infra Part V.
29Part III. International price control regulations and their eﬀectiveness.
Almost every foreign country has a single-payer health care system. These systems all impose some type of cost
control mechanisms on prescription drug spending. This Part will detail some aspects of price controls in each
country and will try to determine the eﬀects of these regulations on international research and development. As we
will see, countries use price mechanisms to accomplish various goals, such as promoting domestic economic growth
or capping spending at certain predetermined budget targets. However, none of these cost control schemes are
designed to look at the costs associated with developing pharmaceuticals and fairly compensate drug companies
for their research expenditures.
1. Domestic and foreign price control regulations
French direct price regulation
France has resorted to using direct price controls in order to hold down costs.80 The prices of new products must
be approved before the product is launched and increases in prices must also be approved. Otherwise, the drugs
will not be covered by the government insurance. The price control regulations are based on several criteria.
France regulates prices based on comparisons within a therapeutic group, therapeutic merit, and contribution to
the domestic economy. Therefore, the government allows a higher rate of reimbursement for pharmaceuticals
that are produced domestically.81 Often, the government will impose across the board price cuts. Further, the
80 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 16.
81 See id. at 17.
30government applies a comprehensive revenue limit on certain popular drugs – regardless of the volume of that
drug sold, the total reimbursements associated with that drug cannot exceed a certain preset budget.82
Canadian comparative price regulation
Canada also imposes direct price controls – however, Canada uses diﬀerent criteria to determine price.83 The
reasonableness of prices is determined by comparing the price charged in Canada with the median price of the
drug in nine other industrialized countries. If the drug has a therapeutic equivalent, reasonableness is determined
by comparing the price to prices of other drugs in the same class. The government routinely reviews the prices of
existing prescription medications to ensure they are still reasonable. Further, post-launch price increases cannot
outpace the rate of general inﬂation. Before 1993, Canada reserved the right to issue a compulsory right for any
drug that was overpriced.84
Unfortunately, neither the French nor Canadian schemes are aimed at calculating the global joint costs of research
and allowing drug companies to recoup reasonable returns on their sunk costs. These price controls are often
based on subjective factors and arbitrary political discretion85. The Canadian system is arguably more objective
than the French. However, in practice, international comparisons are just as arbitrary due to the many factors
in each country that may account for diﬀerent prices. These factors include diﬀerent purchasing power, diﬀerent
doses and unit sizes, exchange rates, distribution costs, advertising costs, liability expenses, and varying input
costs for labor and materials.86 Further, this type of comparative pricing scheme ampliﬁes the eﬀects of the free
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See id.at 18.
86 See id.
31rider problem. By comparing prices is anticipating the pricing dilemma and positioning itself so as to retaliate to
any cost-cutting measures taken by other countries.
The French system is overtly biased towards favoring domestic drug products over foreign products. This govern-
ment system has resulted in the development of imitative drugs that are designed to be sold only in the French
marketplace. Commentators question whether the marginal beneﬁts of these imitative drugs really outweigh their
costs.87
German cost control system: Reference pricing and physician budgets
The German health care system uses two primary forms of cost control. In the ﬁrst form, reference pricing, the
government divides drugs into classes with similar therapeutic properties.88 The government then sets a single
reimbursement rate for all drugs within the class. The reference price is set slightly higher than the lowest priced
drug in the group so as to insure a suﬃcient supply of drugs.89 The reference price for a product may be divided
into subgroups to reﬂect diﬀerent dosages of a product as well as a diverse means of delivering the product (e.g.,
by way of a topical patch as opposed to sublingual). In theory, producers are free to charge a price above the
reference price – patients would then be required to pay the diﬀerence as an out of pocket expense.90 Realistically,
patients’ reluctance to make excess payments makes the price of a drug highly elastic above the reference price.91
87 See id. at 44.
88 See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 165
89 See id.
90 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 19.
91 See id.
32Reference pricing thus provides strong incentives for a company to price its product at the reference price. While
reference pricing thus invokes strong competition for prices above the reference price, there is no incentive for
price competition below the reference price.92 This system is designed to address consumer moral hazard. By
making consumers liable for excess costs, they have an incentive to buy the lowest price drug.93 In thoery this
would then combat the problem of consumer moral hazard by requiring consumers to weigh the costs and beneﬁts
of a drug.
However, in practice the eﬀect of this type of regulation is that all drugs are priced the same, regardless of
eﬀectiveness. Thus, the regulation really has a negative impact because equal pricing destroys the incentives to
investment large amounts in R&D to develop innovative drugs.94 Also, since there is no price competition below
the reference price, this system discourages the use of generic medicines.95 The equalization of prices destroys
market discipline which can lead to an ineﬃcient allocation of capital.
Germany also employs a physician drug budget system.96 Under this system, the government regularly audits a
physician and evaluates his or her prescription history. Each physician’s total drug costs are compared against a
preset government “norm”. Physicians that exceed their norm by more than a set amount may face repayment
of the excess costs.97
Physician drug budgets adopted in Germany appear to have signiﬁcantly decreased drug spending.98 The German
92 See id.
93 See id. at 20.
94 See id. at 50.
95 See id. at 20.
96 See Wertheimer, supra note 19, at 165.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 166
33system signiﬁcantly reduces producer moral hazard by requiring doctors to share in the cost of health care
coverage.99 Physicians have less of an incentive to over prescribe drugs since they could be personally liable for
any excessive costs. This forced accountability appears to have slowed the rate of increase in drug spending, as
well as lowered the overall number of prescriptions issued.100 This type of regulation results in lower costs in a
price-neutral fashion. Thus, it results in more economically eﬃcient decision-making. Conversely, the drawback
of these budgets, as discussed previously,101 is that if there is not enough ﬂexibility, the controls can go too far
and discourage the use of drugs when it is economically eﬃcient.
American cost control strategies
American insurers employ a variety of cost containment strategies including manufacturer discounts, drug formu-
laries, and forced generic substitution.102 Health plans incorporate cost controls with the help of a Pharmacy
Beneﬁt Manager (PBM). Smaller health plans contract with private PBMs while larger health plans will have
their own inhouse PBM. These PBMs are able to negotiate discounted prices with drug manufacturers.103 These
discounts take the form of manufacturer rebates. The range of these discounts is conﬁdential, but experts estimate
they range from 2% - 35%.104
Most PBMs also reduce the cost of prescription drugs through the use of formularies.105 A formulary is list of
drugs that the insurer will reimburse. The insurer will only reimburse drugs on that list. Insurers typically use a
committee of physicians to evaluate and weigh certain factors such the dosage, side eﬀects, eﬃciency, and cost of
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See supra Part II.
102 See Stuart O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy 104, 121 (1997).
103 See HHS, supra note 4.
104 See id.
105 See Schweitzer, supra note 102, at 121.
34a drug.106 The insurance company uses the formulary as leverage to help negotiate lower prices; pharmaceutical
companies will lower prices to ensure they are on an insurer’s formulary. Often, the formulary will consist of a
tiered structure. Under this structure, customers pay a minimal copayment for generic drugs. Then the formulary
will create two tiers of private drugs. The drugs on the lower tier require a smaller co-payment than the drugs on
the higher tier. 107
Formularies help combat consumer moral hazard. By charging consumer diﬀerent fees for drugs, formularies steer
patients towards the most eﬀective and least costly drugs. However, because drugs aﬀect patients in diﬀerent
ways, formularies must contain a wide variety of drugs and retain the ﬂexibility to take special situations into
account.108 Statistical studies demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of these systems at controlling drug costs.109
Finally, PBMs often impose forced generic substitution.110 This requires patients to use a generic drug whenever
it is available. PBMs encourage the use of generic drugs because they cost less than brand-name versions of a
drug and yet they are chemically and therapeutically similar to the brand-name drug.111 This type of measure
ﬁghts consumer moral hazard because it steers consumers to the most cost-eﬀective version a drug.
The British system: rate of return regulation
The United Kingdom employs a scheme that regulates proﬁts rather than regulating prices. Every ﬁve years, repre-
sentatives from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry meet with representatives from the British
Department of Health and the two sides negotiate a compromise that meets the cost control requirements of the
106 See id.
107 See id. at 122.
108 See id.
109 See Brenda Motheral and Kathy A. Fairman, Eﬀect of a three-tier prescription copay on pharmaceutical and other
medical utilization, 39 Medical Care 1293 (2001).
110 See Schweitzer, supra note 102, at 122.
111 See id.
35government while meeting the proﬁt demands of pharmaceutical companies.112 The negotiated Pharmaceutical
Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) limits the maximum total rates of return on capital (ROC) that pharmaceutical
companies are able to earn for all products sold to the national health care system. Though the negotiations are
purely voluntary, every major government customer participates.
Under the scheme, every year companies submit a form that details their annual sales, costs, proﬁts, and deploy-
ment of capital. The company’s deployment of capital is considered to be the value of each company’s research,
manufacturing and distribution facilities within the country. The costs includes the company’s share of general
and administrative expenses, manufacturing overhead, costs of good, research expenditures, and advertising costs.
However, the costs only include the share of costs expended in the country and attributable to sales in that country.
The government further sets limits on the amount of advertising and research expenditures that can be considered
as costs.
Companies then individually negotiate their allowed ROC with the government, which is usually between 17 and
21 percent. Each company’s allowed ROC is determined on factors such as the amount of exports and the percent
of manufacturing and R&D carried on in the U.K.113 The government then looks at each company’s proﬁts and
determines if it has exceeded its allowed ROC. Excess proﬁts are allowed if they are with a certain gray area.
However, if the proﬁts are too high, the company must undergo measures to bring the proﬁts back in line with
the allowed ROC, such as returning proﬁts to the government or cutting prices.114
Under the PPRS, pharmaceutical ﬁrms are free to set their own prices when a product is launched. However,
after that point companies cannot raise prices without approval of the government. The government will only
112 See Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), Department of Health
Discussion Paper: The pharmaceutical price regulation scheme (Spetember 2003), available at
http://www.abpi.org.uk/information/pdfs/PPRS-ABPI-Response-To-DOH.pdf.
113 See Ronald T. Rapp and Adam Lloyd, “Civilized” Pharmaceutical Price Regulations: Can the U.S. have it too?,
Regulation: The Cato Review of Business and Government, at https://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv17n2/reg17n2-
rapp.html.
114 See Department of Health, The Pharmaceutical Price Control Scheme (July 1999), available at
http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/01/99/93/04019993.pdf.
36allow price increases if a company’s ROC falls below 8.5%.115
The British system is drastically diﬀerent from some other stiﬂing price schemes, such as the one used in France.
The PPRS actively encourages domestic R&D spending by allowing pharmaceutical companies to make a proﬁt
on their drug sales in the Britain. However, the government sets reasonable limits on the proﬁts to limit the
enormous costs of pharmaceuticals on the domestic budget.
While the British system encourages domestic R&D, it blatantly discriminates against foreign R&D. British proﬁt
regulation is based on a return on domestic capital.116 The basic rule is not based on the amount of sales the
company does. Thus, foreign subsidiaries doing business in Britain, who usually have little capital invested in the
country, are not able to make a signiﬁcant return on sales. The PPRS does provide for an alternative Return on
Sales (ROS) approach for these types of companies. However, under the ROS, a company is only allowed to earn
a ﬁxed proﬁt of 4.85% on its U.K., with no allowed gray area.117 Thus the system is blatantly biased in only
allowing a reasonable return on research performed within the country. Even for large multinational companies
with signiﬁcant assets in Britain, it is diﬃcult to collect royalties for research done overseas due to restrictions on
transfer pricing.118 Basically, the agreement favors domestic drug companies over foreign competitors.
This agreement is a direct consequence of the prisoner’s dilemma associated with pharmaceutical research and
development. While research done overseas has signiﬁcant beneﬁts in terms of British health, the British are
unwilling to pay the cost of such research. They are only willing to fund research if there is contribution to their
economy. Even given the contribution to their economy, the British will only fund research up to a certain preset
limit and will only allow limited proﬁts on that research. These regulations preserve incentives for domestic R&D,
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
37but they have detrimental consequences for research overseas.
Britain uses further cost controls like capitation compensation for physicians and the use of drug budget scheme
like the one in Germany.119 The government also encourages the use of generic pharmaceuticals through the
implementation of a drug tariﬀ. The tariﬀ provides a ﬁnancial incentive to physicians to prescribe generic drugs.120
119 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 22.
120 See id. at 21.
38IV. Drug reimportation proposals.
When looking at the price controls in many other countries, American citizens feel they are being taken advantage
of. For example, Britain only allows a return on domestic capital and investment – pharmaceutical companies
cannot take the cost of American or other foreign R&D into account when determining the price to sell there.121
The price control regulations explicitly allow Britain to avoid paying for its share of global joint R&D costs.
Considering that many countries have prices even lower than Britain’s,122 there are probably other countries that
are also avoiding the joint costs of R&D.
This is an outgrowth of the free rider problem considered earlier.123 The United States is the largest country
without price controls. The U.S. accounts for more than 54% of worldwide pharmaceutical sales and even a larger
proportion of proﬁts.124 Further, U.S. prices are signiﬁcantly higher than prices overseas, even when accounting
for local factors aﬀecting the price of drugs.125 Accordingly, Americans feel they are unfairly paying for drugs
that are used all over the world. Other countries are free-riding on the beneﬁts of American pharmaceutical
research investments. In order to neutralize the price disparities between American and overseas markets, many
policymakers want to pass a bill that will allow the reimportation of drugs from overseas back into the U.S.
The reasoning behind making reimportation of drugs from other nations legal is that competition from lower cost
imported pharmaceuticals will force companies to lower prices in the U.S. Currently, the 1987 Prescription Drug
Marketing Act126 restricts reimportation of foreign drugs into the US due to safety concerns. However, analysts
121 See supra Part III.
122 See Danzon, supra note 12, at 31.
123 See supra Part II.
124 See Scheherazade Daneshkhu, US closer to battle with Europe over drug prices, Financial Times.com (May 14, 2004),
at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer? pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1083180526584
125 See CBO, supra note 7.
126 Pub. Law No. 100-293.
39believe that these safety concern can be overcome and that reimportation is a viable option.127
On December 8, 2003, President passed into law the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion Act.128 The bill primarily provides a prescription drug beneﬁt plan for senior citizens. However, included in
the bill is a provision allowing pharmacists, wholesalers, and customer to reimport drugs from Canada, but only
if the Secretary of Health and Human Services establishes guidelines under which he can certify the practice is
safe.129 Secretary Thomson has already stated that he does not believe the practice of reimportation is safe with
current resources and so he will not be able to create a feasible plan for reimportation.130
Several months ago, the House passed a much more comprehensive bill allowing the reimportation of pharmaceu-
ticals from 25 other industrialized countries.131 A similar bill was introduced in the Senate a few months ago,
but failed to pass.132 However, due to increased pressure from voters and the upcoming elections, many Senators
who were previously opposed may reconsider their position.133 A bill similar to the House bill was very recently
reintroduced in the Senate.134 In a recent interview, the Sectary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Tommy
Thompson, acknowledged that while he is still opposed to drug reimportation, adoption of the idea is politically
inevitable and George Bush should not stand in the way.135
Drug reimportation may help end the trend of Americans subsidizing drug production for the rest of the world.
However, the bill does not establish a system whereby drug companies will be able to recover their sunk costs.
Maybe, after the reimportation bill has been passed, drug companies might be forced to raise their prices else-
where. While this is a possibility, it is unclear that drug companies have the political clout overseas to force
127 See Schuler, supra note 9.
128 Pub. Law No. 108-173.
129 See id.
130 See Schuler, supra note 9.
131 H.R. 2427, 108th Congress (2003).
132 See Schuler, supra note 9.
133 See id.
134 S. 2307, 108th Congress (2004).
135 See Bush Administration reconsidering Canadian drugs, YahooNews (May 7 2004), at
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ibsys/20040507/lo wisc/2196499.
40governments to drop price controls. Further, price controls will have the eﬀect of homogenizing drug prices across
the industrialized countries. This homogenization of prices is directly contradictory to the price discrimination
policy developed by Frank Ramsey.
Congress wanted to ﬁnd a market solution to the drug price crisis,136 however, drug reimportation merely imports
price controls from other countries – it would be the same as imposing controls ourselves. Thus all countries
will now avoid paying their share of research expenses and drug research will be stiﬂed. The only way to achieve
true international parity in prices is to assure that all countries are paying their fair share of drug development
costs. The only way to solve the issue of international joint sunk costs is through some international agreement
or treaty, similar to the TRIPs agreement in WTO.
The investigative arm of Congress, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), further weighed in on the debate
over reimportation by recently releasing a report that criticizes the proposal.137 According to the agency, bringing
in drugs from 25 industrialized nations under the House Bill would only reduce spending on medications in the
United States by about 1 percent. The CBO pointed out that supply limitations, contractual limitations imposed
by pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and the potential for foreign governments to take action blocking exports to the United
States would limit the actual number of prescriptions that will be redirected to the U.S. market. The small trickle
of drugs coming into the market will have little eﬀect on U.S. prices.138
136 See Schuler, supra note 9.
137 See CBO, supra note 7.
138 See id.
41Part V. International treaty for sharing sunk costs.
Since the drug reimportation provision in the new Medicare Act will not eﬀectively allocate the global joint costs of
pharmaceutical development, this section outlines the elements of a new international framework that can equitably
distribute these joint costs. As discussed earlier, recovery of the joint costs associated with pharmaceutical research
and development presents the classic prisoner’s dilemma.139 A government can be easily tempted by the option
of pricing prescription drugs down to marginal cost and allowing other countries to bear the costs associated with
research and development. Pharmaceutical companies themselves do not have the negotiating leverage to deal
directly with foreign governments. Since pharmaceutical companies do not have the market power to combat the
threat of foreign compulsory licenses, fairly distributing pharmaceutical joint costs requires the mutual cooperation
of the countries beneﬁting most from pharmaceutical research and development.
Unless the industrialized countries come to an agreement concerning prescription drug pricing regulations, indi-
vidual regulations in each country will hamper eﬀorts to recover the sunk costs of drug development. If drug
companies are unable to recover their sunk costs, investment in drug development will decrease and many life-
saving and cost-saving therapeutics will be prevented from coming to market. The international community must
come together and ensure fair pricing for pharmaceuticals. Unless each country monitors its neighbors, govern-
ments have too strong of an incentive to price pharmaceuticals below the point where sunk costs can be recovered.
Since the United States, Europe, and Japan represent the three largest pharmaceutical markets and account for
the lion’s share of revenue for the largest multinational drug companies, any international framework regulating
prescription drug costs will require their approval. However, the beneﬁts of the new treaty will be maximized if
the other industrialized countries can be persuaded to sign on, and especially if developing nations can also be
139 See supra Part II.
42persuaded to sign.
The proposed treaty will have a limited scope. It will focus on allowing companies to recover the sunk costs
associated with the development of internationally-marketed drugs. Thus, the treaty will cover only patented
pharmaceuticals, since these drugs are the most susceptible to regulatory abuse. Further, since the treaty ad-
dresses international sharing of costs, the treaty will only cover patented drugs that are marketed in at least three
major international markets. These restrictions should help narrow down the scope and complexity of the treaty.
Any international restriction on the use of cost controls must recognize that some cost controls are necessary and
economically eﬃcient. Therefore, the treaty will allow, and even encourage, the use of price controls aimed at
reducing moral hazard while at the same time prohibiting regulations designed to merely avoid joint sharing of
research costs. In practice, it can often be diﬃcult to ascertain which regulations are desirable and regulations
are not. Unfortunately, the treaty will necessarily some ambiguity as to this question.
However, any international framework must be ﬂexible and recognize the unique desires of participating govern-
ments. Some governments are willing to endure slightly higher drug costs if the prices will encourage domestic
R&D investment. Further, every country takes a diﬀerent approach to the beneﬁts of widespread marketing and
advertising. Finally, the treaty must recognize that prescription drug spending is straining every government’s
budget and thus some level of price control is absolutely necessary. Keeping all of the country-to-country diﬀer-
ences in mind, however, the treaty must ﬁrst and foremost ensure fairness among all countries. Most countries will
be more willing to pay a slightly higher burden for prescription drug costs if an international framework ensures
that other countries are providing their fair share of joint costs.
1. Outline of proposed international framework
This new international framework for regulating prescription drug costs is based on the British system of rate of
43return regulation.140 The new framework allows countries to impose reasonable proﬁt limits, while other countries
can avoid proﬁt limits if they so desire. However, unlike the British system, this system ensures that joint research
costs are shared globally in an equitable manner.
Under the framework, governments will not be able to directly set drug prices. Governments will only have the
discretion to set some reasonable limits on drug proﬁts. This treaty will provide a universal framework where each
country can choose whether or not it wants to set some reasonable limit on pharmaceutical proﬁts. At the same
time, it ensures that no country sets a price cap so low that companies cannot recover joint R&D costs. Further,
since the treaty only regulates drugs that are still patented, governments are free to exercise any cost restrictions
on oﬀ-patent drugs, such as forced generic substitution.
Further, to avoid the dangers of governments exercising too much monopoly power, governments will not be
able to negotiate directly with pharmaceutical companies nor will they be able to directly set prices unless proﬁts
exceed the predetermined cap. This means that governments will not be able to directly set drug prices nor could
they require prior approval of a drug price before it is placed on a market. Governments also cannot impose any
caps on drug price increases. In addition, under the treaty governments will not be able to implement regulations
that have substantially the same eﬀect as direct price control. An example of such a measure is reference pricing.
While governments in reference pricing schemes do not directly set a drug’s price, when the system is applied in
practice, producers are usually forced to sell the drug at a price equal to the reference price reimbursement.
This restriction on the use of schemes that have substantially the same eﬀect as price control regulations will
introduce signiﬁcant uncertainties into the treaty. There will also need to a dispute resolution forum that can
determine when cost controls cross the line from being reasonable to being unreasonable. This third-party could be
a new multinational nongovernmental organization (NGO) formed for the express purpose of ensuring compliance
140 Discussed in Part III supra.
44with this treaty. On the other hand, the third party could be a neutral arbitrator that is chosen when a dispute
arises between treaty members. Despite the costs and uncertainties of third-party monitoring, a ﬂexible provision
that restricts the cost controls member nations can use is necessary. Without such a ﬂexible prohibition of cost
control schemes, nations would be able to easily circumvent the treaty and negotiate directly with pharmaceutical
companies, thus undermining the purpose the new treaty.
Another example of the uncertainty inherent in the treaty will be the use of formularies. This is because formularies
can serve a dual purpose. By creating diﬀerent tiers of drug prices, formularies can steer patients towards the most
cost-eﬀective drugs. As discussed in the previous section, empirical research demonstrates the signiﬁcant cost-
saving beneﬁts of a formulary system. However, the threat of not including a drug on the formulary or the threat
of placing a drug on the highest tier can give national governments signiﬁcant negotiating leverage. Therefore,
the use of formularies will be allowed on a limited basis – governments will be allowed to develop formularies
based drug eﬀectiveness and based on cost-beneﬁt analyses. However, under the new treaty, formularies cannot
be used as a tool for governments to directly negotiate prices. Also, formularies cannot be used to favor domestic
drugs over foreign drugs.
However, the treaty will allow governments some ﬂexibility to control prices in their own governments. Drugs will
be priced diﬀerently in each country based on the cost of business in that country and based on that country’s
share of international joint costs. Since price will be speciﬁc to each country, parallel drug trade, or the direct
sale of prescription drugs from one country to another, will not be permitted under the plan. Citizens in each
country must purchase drugs from domestic suppliers.
3. Hypothetical application of the concepts of the proposed international treaty
Prescription drug pricing is currently fraught with many complexities, and thus any treaty that attempts to
standardize pricing across many countries will also be very complicated. However, the proposed system is easier
45to understand when it is applied to a simple hypothetical example. In this example, there are two countries, the
United States and the United Kingdom, and two pharmaceutical ﬁrms, Pﬁzer and Merck.141 Both countries have
signed the proposed international cost-sharing treaty. The United States has decided to impose a 30% cap on
pharmaceutical rates of return. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has decided to impose a 20% cap on
pharmaceutical rates of return, the lowest cap allowed under the treaty. In addition, the U.K has imposed limits
on pharmaceutical advertising; so advertising spending is much less there.
The limits on spending are allowed so that countries will be able to limit costs. Countries can set reasonable
limits on any type of domestic expenditures.142 There can even be a reasonable limit on the amount of domestic
research allowed, as long as the country is paying its share of joint research costs. Further, a country can also set
diﬀerent maximum rates of return on each type of expenditure, as long as it still allows the minimum 20% return
on each type. It can also discriminate between foreign and domestic research expenditures by allowing a return
of higher than 25% on domestic research costs.143
The table below details expenditures and sales by the two pharmaceutical companies in each country.
Table 2. Hypothetical pharmaceutical pricing example with
two
coun-
tries
and
two
drug
ﬁrms
Cost component U.S.
U.K.
Pﬁzer
141 All numbers are purely hypothetical.
142 These are really spending limits, it is just a limit the maximum cost that the country will allow as an expense for determining
return on capital.
143 Again, as long as it still allows a 20% return on joint research costs.
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(no.
of
pre-
scrip-
tions)144
900 500
Annual
R&D
costs
$2,000 $500
Marketing costs $2,000 $500
Merck
Sales
(no.
of
pre-
scrip-
tions)
450 1,000
Annual
R&D
costs
$1,000 $1,000
Marketing
costs
$1,500 $500
Cost of goods
sold and
distribution
cost are $1 per
prescription
U.K.
per
capita
GDP
is
90%
of
U.S.
per
capita
GDP
144 Sales volume can not be determined by dollars of sales, since the treaty is used to determine the prices. Thus volume must
be measured in number of prescriptions, number of doses, or number of pills. Since dosing varies country by country, measuring by
the number of prescription is probably the best way to compare the beneﬁts each country receives from a certain pharmaceutical.
47Under the proposed treaty, Pﬁzer’s R&D expenditures are allocated based on the number of prescriptions the
company sold in each country. The number of sales in each country is adjusted based on some measure of income,
such as per capital GDP. This income adjustment is one of the key aspects of the treaty. This ensures that R&D
expenditures are allocated to countries in an equitable fashion based on which country is most able to share the
burden. It is also an incentive for smaller to come on board and join the treaty. If a country’s GDP is signiﬁcantly
lower than those of the big industrialized nations, it may easily be able to achieve cheaper prices under this treaty
than it would without it.
Because the U.K’s per capita GDP is 90% of U.S. per capita GDP, Pﬁzer’s U.K. sales are discounted 10% from
500 to 450. Thus, Pﬁzer’s total income-adjusted sales are 1,350.145 Accordingly, Pﬁzer’s sales are weighted 67%
in the U.S. and 33% in the U.K.
Pﬁzer’s total research expenditure in both countries is $2,500. These research expenditures are allocated between
the U.S. and the U.K. based on the income-adjusted sales ratio of 67% : 33%. So, $1,667 of research expenditures
are allocated to U.S. sales, and $833 of research expenditures are allocated to the U.K. sales. For the 900
prescriptions Pﬁzer sold in the U.S., Pﬁzer has $900 in manufacturing and distribution costs,146 $1,667 in R&D
expenditures attributable to the U.S., and $2,000 in marketing expenditures – for a total cost of about $4,500.
Further, Pﬁzer is allowed to make a maximum 30% return on those costs, which is a return of about $1,400.
Thus, the maximum revenue Pﬁzer is allowed to collect in the United States is the $4,500 in costs plus the $1,400
limit on returns. This means Pﬁzer faces a revenue cap of about $5,900 and the highest average price Pﬁzer
would be able to charge is about $6.60 per prescription.
145900 in the U.S. and 450 in the U.K.
146Based on the assumption of $1 in manufacturing and distribution costs for each prescription.
48However, because of the more stringent price restrictions in the United Kingdom, prices there will be signiﬁcantly
lower. For the 500 prescriptions Pﬁzer sold in the U.K., it has $500 in manufacturing and distribution costs (based
on $1 per prescription), $833 in R&D expenditures, and $500 in advertising expenditures – for a total cost of
about $1,850. In the U.K., Pﬁzer is then allowed to make a 20% return on its cost – which is about $350. For the
year, Pﬁzer would be allowed to collect maximum sales revenue of about $2,200 in the U.K., $1,850 to recover
its costs and $350 as a return on those costs. This comes out to a price of about $4.40 per prescription, which
33% less than the cost of the same prescription in the United States. While Britain has achieved signiﬁcant cost
savings under the treaty, it has achieved those savings while ensuring that British citizens are contributing their
fair share of the joint costs of drug development.
The same calculations can be performed for Merck. Merck has total income-adjusted sales of 1,350, only 450 of
which are in the U.S. Thus, $666 of Merck’s $2,000 R&D expenditures are allocated to the United States. Under
the new treaty, Merck would be able to charge a maximum average price of $7.50 per prescription in the United
States147 and a maximum average price of $3.40 per prescription in the U.K.148
In reality, the price control regulations under this treaty will be look-back regulations. Using the Pﬁzer sales
example from above, at the beginning of the year Pﬁzer would not know its exact costs and its exact sales in
the U.K. It would have to approximate an appropriate price at the start of the year. At this time, Pﬁzer would
be free to set any price it chose. Then, by the end of the year, Pﬁzer would calculate its relevant sales and cost
information and submit it to the British government. The U.K. government would look at the company’s revenue
and retroactively determine whether Pﬁzer charged a reasonable price for its drugs. If Pﬁzer made enough revenue
to give the company more than a 20% rate of return (in the hypothetical, if Pﬁzer had more than the $2,150 in
maximum allowed revenue), then the government could either require Pﬁzer to refund the extra revenue to its
147 Based on manufacturing costs of $450, R&D expenses of $666, marketing costs of $1,500, and a 30% proﬁt margin.
148 Based on manufacturing costs of $1000, R&D expenses of $1,334, marketing costs of $500, and a 20% proﬁt margin.
49customers, or force Pﬁzer to lower prices for the next year to compensate for the extra earnings.
This international framework is very similar to current British cost control regulations. However, under the current
regulations, companies are only allowed to earn a return on research expenditures if the research occurs in Britain.
This treaty means the British will face slightly higher prices than they would under their current system. For
example, under the proposed treaty, Pﬁzer can charge as much as $4.40 per prescription. Under current British
regulations, though, Pﬁzer would only be able to recover $500 for R&D expenditures rather than $833 – and so
Pﬁzer could only charge an average price of $3.60 per prescription. The proposed treaty raises prices for British
consumers because it ensures that British consumers are paying a share of international R&D expenses (adjusted
for income) rather than just paying for domestic R&D expenditures.
Under the treaty, a country is permitted to take measures to encourage domestic research expenditures. A country
that wants to stimulate domestic R&D can allow a higher rate of return on domestic R&D expenditures. Using
the Pﬁzer example from above, the U.K. could decide to allow companies a 30% rate of return on domestic
R&D while still capping returns on all other expenditures at 20%. Under this new scenario, Pﬁzer could earn a
return of 30% on its U.K. R&D investment, but could only earn a 20% return on the excess $333 of U.S. R&D
expenditures attributed to the U.K. Pﬁzer could now a maximum average price of about $4.50 in the U.K. If the
British were to adopt this system, it would encourage Pﬁzer to shift more R&D expenditures to the U.K. in the
future so as to raise the prices it can charge in that market. The U.K. would also beneﬁt because the domestic
R&D expenditures would stimulate domestic economic growth.
While the regulations under this treaty cap the maximum return that a drug company can earn, the regulations
do not require that drug companies earn a minimum return on their investment. Though there are no limits
on the ability of drug companies to raise prices, the companies will not be able to earn a guaranteed proﬁt
if governments research the cost-eﬀectiveness of pharmaceuticals and steer patients towards the most beneﬁcial
50drugs. In this way, competitive market pressures will be restored because pharmaceuticals companies will be subject
to market discipline. The product markets will determine a drug company’s proﬁts. Because rates of return are
not guaranteed, drug companies will still have an incentive to spend money prudently and focus research on the
most productive and innovative drug candidates.
4. Summary
In summary, this treaty is designed to replicate the eﬀects of the Ramsey pricing model on an international scale.
If we assume that each country is a customer in the global marketplace for drugs, then the most eﬃcient way
to price pharmaceuticals is to charge each country a diﬀerent price based on its willingness to pay. Since it is
diﬃcult to measure a country’s willingness to pay, and given the high inelasticity of prescription drug prices, a
good metric to measure the willingness to pay is to use the ability to pay. Accordingly, this treaty applies the
Ramsey model to the international prescription drug marketplace by charging each country a diﬀerent price based
on its ability to pay. This will maximize revenue for the pharmaceutical companies and thus maintain incentives
for future research. Further, it maximizes social welfare because the maximum number of countries will have
access to life-saving drugs.
Marginal Cost
Demand Curve
Quantity
Price
Figure 9. Application of the Ramsey model to an international marketplace.
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